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Abstract
“Predecisional information distortion”occurs when decision makers evaluate new informa-
tion in a way that is biased towards their leading option. The phenomenon is well estab-
lished, as is the method typically used to measure it, termed “stepwise evolution of
preference” (SEP). An inadequacy of this method has recently come to the fore: it measures
distortion as the total advantage afforded a leading option over its competitor, and therefore
it cannot differentiate between distortion to strengthen a leading option (“proleader” distor-
tion) and distortion to weaken a trailing option (“antitrailer” distortion).To address this,
recent research introduced new response scales to SEP. We explore whether and how
these new response scales might influence the very proleader and antitrailer processes that
they were designed to capture (“reactivity”).We used the SEP method with concurrent ver-
bal reporting: fifty family physicians verbalized their thoughts as they evaluated patient
symptoms and signs (“cues”) in relation to two competing diagnostic hypotheses. Twenty-
five physicians evaluated each cue using the response scale traditional to SEP (a single
response scale, returning a single measure of distortion); the other twenty-five did so using
the response scales introduced in recent studies (two separate response scales, returning
two separate measures of distortion:proleader and antitrailer). We measured proleader and
antitrailer processes in verbalizations, and compared verbalizations in the single-scale and
separate-scales groups. Response scales did not appear to affect proleader processes: the
two groups of physicians were equally likely to bolster their leading diagnosis verbally.
Response scales did, however, appear to affect antitrailer processes: the two groups deni-
grated their trailing diagnosis verbally to differing degrees. Our findings suggest that the
response scales used to measure information distortion might influence its constituent pro-
cesses, limiting their generalizability across and beyond experimental studies.
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Introduction
Decisionmakers are not unbiased in their treatment of newly arriving evidence. Rather, they
appear to evaluate incoming information in a way that supports an emerging hypothesis or
preference [1–22]. This phenomenon is known as “predecisional information distortion”
(hereafter “distortion”) [1, 2] and it implies that reasoning is bidirectional: processed informa-
tion feeds into conclusions, but emerging conclusions in turn shape the manner in which new
information is processed [3, 7]. This is thought to aid decisionmakers in attaining and main-
taining a state of “cognitive coherence” [3, 7, 23, 24]; that is, a consistent representation of the
choice options and their attributes.
Distortion is pervasive (for reviews, see [25, 26]). It manifests in a variety of populations
(e.g., [4, 15, 27]) and choice domains (e.g., [15, 18, 27]). It affects the evaluation of real and
hypothetical options [28], and that of neutral and diagnostic information [2, 15]. It occurs
when preferences are installed experimentally and when they are allowed to develop naturally
[1, 2], and it occurs regardless of whether a final choice among options is expected [2, 5]. It has
been linked to predecisional commitment to an option [15] and eventual selection of an option
[13, 18, 20]. Indeed, it has been linked to the selection of an inferior option [10] and appears to
withstand monetary incentives for accuracy [29, 30].
While distortion has been studied extensively, the response scales used to measure it have
not. Distortion is most often measured by the “stepwise evolution of preference” (SEP) method
[2]. By this method, participants typically face a choice between two options (e.g., restaurants).
Items of information (“cues”) describing features of the two options are presented sequentially
(e.g., menus, opening hours). In response to each cue, participants are asked to rate the extent
to which it favors one option over the other (e.g., a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) anchored at
“favors option A” and “favors option B”). They are also asked to indicate their preferred option,
based on all information seen so far. Distortion is thought to occurwhen a cue is rated as overly
favorable toward the option that is preferred at the time. This is usually measured relative to
the responses provided by a separate control group: a group who rate the same cues in relation
to the same two options, but who are precluded from developing any preferred option that
might bias their ratings.
Recently, the limitations of this procedure were pointed out by three different teams of
researchers [19–21]. The response scale is comparative: it measures distortion as the relative
advantage afforded a leading option over its competitor. Therefore, it cannot measure sepa-
rately the two processes thought to comprise distortion: distortion to strengthen a leading
option (“proleader” distortion) and distortion to weaken a trailing option (“antitrailer” distor-
tion). To overcome this, Blanchard and colleagues [19], DeKay and colleagues [20] and Nurek
and colleagues [21] introduced new response scales to SEP. They replaced the single, compara-
tive response scale (e.g., “favors option A” to “favors option B”) with separate, option-specific
response scales (e.g., “no support” to “strong support” for option A; “no support” to “strong
support” for option B [21]). This allowed for 1) separate evaluation of information in relation
to leading and trailing options, and therefore 2) separate measurement of proleader and anti-
trailer distortion. Two of these studies found reliable evidence for proleader distortion [19, 20]
and all three found reliable evidence for antitrailer distortion.
Response scales are a powerful task feature. A change in response mode can impact findings
in important ways. For example, Lichtenstein and Slovic [31] identified preference reversals
when participants were required to choose vs. price monetary gambles (A and B): participants
tended to selectA but priced B higher. Hsee [32] identified similar reversals when participants
were required to price consumer items one-at-a-time vs. side-by-side: separate pricing favored
A but simultaneous pricing favored B. In the current context, the simple provision of separate
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response scales for leading and trailing options could provide the opportunity–and indeed,
alter the tendency–to distort each option. For example, separate evaluation of cues in relation
to leading and trailing options might force participants to consider support for the trailing
option more fully than they would otherwisehave done (“consider the opposite” [33]). Equally,
if separate response scales call attention to the trailing option, they might also call for its deni-
gration. In short, the response scales used to measure distortion (single vs. separate) might
influence the type of distortion observed (proleader vs. antitrailer) (“reactivity” [34, 35]).
We aimed to investigate the effect of response scales on proleader and antitrailer processes.
We achieved this using SEP with concurrent verbal reporting: we asked family physicians to
verbalize their thoughts as they evaluated sequentially presented cues (items of patient data) in
relation to two competing diagnostic hypotheses, in the context of two clinical cases. One
group of physicians did so using the single response scale traditional to SEP (the “single-scale”
group); another group did so using the separate response scales introduced in more recent
work (the “separate-scales” group).We measured proleader and antitrailer processes in verbali-
zations, and compared these verbalizations in the single-scale vs. separate-scales groups. The
findings contribute to a topical body of work concerning the measurement of proleader and
antitrailer processes in predecisional information distortion.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from King’s College London Biomedical Sciences,
Dentistry, Medicine and Natural and Mathematical Sciences Research Ethics Subcommittee
(ref BDM/13/14-104). Informed consent was obtained from participants in writing.
Materials
We employed two clinical cases, which were used by Kostopoulou and colleagues [15] and
Nurek and colleagues [21] to investigate predecisional information distortion in medical diag-
nosis. One described a patient with dyspnea (which could be due to either heart failure or
chronic lung disease) and the other a patient with fatigue (which could be caused by either dia-
betes or depression). Each patient case began with a brief introduction, which contained the
patient’s name, age, sex, health complaint and a “diagnostic steer”; i.e., three clinical cues that
provided strong support for one of the two competing diagnoses. For each patient case, half of
the physicians saw a steer favoring diagnosis A and half saw a steer favoring diagnosis B (ran-
domly assigned and counterbalanced). Thereafter, each patient case delivered a sequence of
4–5 “neutral” clinical cues. Each neutral cue provided some support for both diagnostic
hypotheses, and equal support for the two. Materials took the form of questionnaires, con-
structed and administered online using Qualtrics.
Procedure
We arranged telephone interviewswith the participating physicians. Ten minutes prior to the
interview, physicians received an e-mail containing a link to the study website and a telephone
number to dial toll-free from a landline. Physicians were aware that telephone calls would be
audio-recorded. Once on the phone with the researcher (MN), physicians began the online
questionnaire. They were instructed to think aloud, i.e., verbalize any thoughts that came to
mind, as they completed the questionnaire. They were asked not to explain their reasoning, but
simply to report the contents of working memory [34, 36–39]. They were also asked to read
aloud anything that appeared on the screen, i.e., cues and questions. To ensure that physicians
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
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understood these instructions, the questionnaire began with a non-clinical practice task. This
allowed physicians to grow accustomed to thinking aloud and gave the researcher an opportu-
nity to provide feedback [34, 36, 38, 40].
Physicians then encountered the two patient cases in a random order. Each case began with
a patient introduction, which contained a diagnostic steer (seeMaterials). Based on this, physi-
cians gave an initial estimate of diagnostic likelihoodon a 21-point VAS, anchored at “diagno-
sis A more likely” and “diagnosis B more likely” (Fig 1).
Physicians then encountered four (dyspnea case) or five (fatigue case) neutral cues, which
were presented sequentially and in a random order. They were asked to respond to each cue,
providing 1) a rating of its diagnostic value and 2) an updated estimate of diagnostic likelihood,
based on all the information seen so far.
Ratings of diagnostic value were cast under one of two response modes. Half of the sample
(the single-scale group) was randomly assigned to rate the diagnostic value of each cue using a
single 21-point VAS, anchored at “favors diagnosis A” and “favors diagnosis B” (Fig 2). This
single response scale–traditional to SEP–was used by Kostopoulou et al. [15] to measure distor-
tion in physicians’ diagnostic judgments. The other half of the sample (the separate-scales
group) rated the diagnostic value of each cue using two separate 11-point VASs, one per
Fig 1. Scale used to estimate diagnostic likelihood after 1) the steer and 2) each cue evaluation. The same scale was used by
Kostopoulou et al. [15] and Nurek et al. [21].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.g001
Fig 2. Scale used to collect ratings of cue diagnosticity in the single-scale group. The same scale was used by Kostopoulou et al.
[15]. Participants were required to place one mark upon the scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.g002
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562 September 14, 2016 4 / 17
diagnostic hypothesis, each anchored at “no support” and “strong support” (Fig 3). These sepa-
rate response scales–new to SEP–were used by Nurek et al. [21] to measure proleader and anti-
trailer distortion in physicians’ diagnostic judgments. In both groups, estimates of diagnostic
likelihoodwere always cast on a 21-point VAS (Fig 1).
If physicians fell silent during the questionnaire, the researcher said in a neutral voice “keep
talking” [36, 38]. Upon completion of the two cases, the telephone call was terminated. The
questionnaire concluded with a Debrief Sheet, which explained the nature of the bias under
study (information distortion) and gave physicians an opportunity to withdraw their data
(tick-box).
Data analysis
Measuring distortion in cue ratings. By the SEP method, the distortion of a cue is mea-
sured relative to its “baseline” rating, i.e., the mean rating given thereto by a separate control
group of participants [2]. Control participants typically evaluate exactly the same cues as those
seen by the experimental group, but they are precluded from developing any overarching pref-
erence (or leading diagnosis) that could bias their cue ratings [2, 15, 21].
Baseline ratings for the present cues were readily available from our previous work. In the
study by Kostopoulou et al. [15], a control group of 36 physicians provided baseline ratings for
these cues using a single cue evaluation scale (Fig 2). In the study by Nurek et al. [21] (study 1),
a control group of 43 physicians provided baseline ratings for the same cues using two separate
cue evaluation scales (Fig 3). The procedure used to obtain baseline ratings was described at
length in these publications [15, 21] and is also explained here in the Supporting Information
(S1 Text).
We used the baseline cue ratings gathered by Kostopoulou et al. [15] to calculate “leader-
signed distortion” [2] in the single-scale group, and the baseline cue ratings gathered by Nurek
et al. [21] (study 1) to calculate leader-signed proleader and antitrailer distortion in the sepa-
rate-scales group. Distortion was calculated exactly as described by Kostopoulou et al. [15] and
Fig 3. Scales used to collect ratings of cue diagnosticity in the separate-scales group. The same scales were used by Nurek et al.
[21]. Participants were required to place one mark upon each scale. The diagnosis evaluated first was counterbalanced across
participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.g003
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Nurek et al. [21], respectively. Full details are available in the Supporting Information (S2
Text).
Coding verbal protocols. Recorded interviewswere transcribed and analyzed by the first
author. The second author analyzed a randomly selected subset (20%) for the purposes of mea-
suring agreement.
Protocol analysis aimed to identify and characterize, per cue, verbalizations about the diag-
nosis that was leading at the time (“Verb_Lead”) and verbalizations about the diagnosis that
was trailing at the time (“Verb_Trail”).
For each cue, Verb_Lead was defined as any utterance/s connecting the given cue to the
diagnosis that was leading at the time. Likewise,Verb_Trail was defined as any utterance/s con-
necting the given cue to the diagnosis that was trailing at the time.We excluded 1) utterances
made in the absence of a leading diagnosis (i.e., when the most recent estimate of diagnostic
likelihoodwas 0 = “equally likely”) and 2) utterances made when physicians were providing
estimates of diagnostic likelihood (Fig 1) rather than cue evaluations (Figs 2 or 3).
We developed a coding scheme to characterize the Verb_Lead and Verb_Trail per cue. Each
Verb (Lead/Trail) received one of four possible codes: “supportive”, “non-supportive”,
“unclear” or “nothing”. Definitions and examples for each category appear in Table 1.
The four categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. If a given Verb (e.g., Ver-
b_Lead) contained conflicting utterances (e.g., some supportive utterances and some non-sup-
portive utterances), we coded the physician’s final utterance. Coders were blinded to the
ratings that each physician provided for each cue (unless the physician verbalized this), and to
the extent of each cue’s distortion. They were aware only of the physician’s leading diagnosis at
the time, which was integral to the physicians’ utterances and used to identify Verb_Lead and
Verb_Trail. Full guidelines for coding verbal protocols are available in the Supporting Informa-
tion (S3 Text).
Measuring proleader and antitrailer processes in verbalizations (separate-scales
group). Separate scales for the evaluation of two competing options allows for the separate
measurement of proleader and antitrailer distortion in cue ratings. Therefore, we used data
from the separate-scales group to explore the relationship between distortion in relation to an
option (leading/trailing) and verbalizations about that option. We hypothesized that:
H1: As proleader distortion increases, so will the tendency to make “supportive” verbaliza-
tions about the leading diagnosis.
H2: As antitrailer distortion increases, so will the tendency to make “non-supportive” ver-
balizations about the trailing diagnosis.
To test these hypotheses, we ran two multilevel logistic regression models (one per hypothe-
sis), with random intercepts to account for cue ratings clustered within physicians. The model
forH1 used a physician’s proleader distortion score for a cue to predict his/her Verb_Lead for
that cue (1 = supportive; 0 = any other category). The model forH2 used a physician’s antitrai-
ler distortion score for a cue to predict his/her Verb_Trail for that cue (1 = non-supportive;
0 = any other category).
Assessing the effect of response scales on verbalizations (single-scalevs. separate-scales
groups). If H1 andH2 are true, then we have developed a valid means of measuring proleader
and antitrailer processes in verbalizations rather than cue ratings. We can then explore the
effect of response scales (single vs. separate) on these verbalizations.We hypothesized that:
H3: If response scales affect proleader processing, then the single-scale group and the sepa-
rate-scales group will differ in their tendency to make “supportive” verbalizations about the
leading diagnosis.
H4: If response scales affect antitrailer processing, then the two groups will differ in their
tendency to make “non-supportive” verbalizations about the trailing diagnosis.
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
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Table 1. Coding scheme for protocol analysis.
Code Definition Examples
Supportive The cue was perceived to support the diagnosis 1. Cue is considered a feature of the
diagnosis:“
• [cue] is a presenting factor for [diagnosis
A]”
• “you can get [cue] with [diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] is consistent with [diagnosis A]”
2. Cue is perceived to increase the
likelihood of the diagnosis:
• “[cue] makes [diagnosis A] more likely”
• “[cue] would add to the diagnosis of
[diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] suggests/supports/favors
[diagnosis A]”
3. Cue leads participant towards the
diagnosis:
• “given [cue], I’m now thinking [diagnosis
A]”
• “[cue] sends me towards [diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] makes me want to explore
[diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] makes me consider [diagnosis A]
as a possibility”
Non-
supportive
The cue was not perceived to support the
diagnosis
1. Cue is not considered a feature of the
diagnosis:
• “[cue] is not a presenting factor for
[diagnosis A]”
• “You don’t usually see [cue] with
[diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] is not consistent with [diagnosis
A]”
2. Cue is not perceived to increase the
likelihood of the diagnosis:*
• “[cue] doesn’t help me to know whether
this is [diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] tells me nothing about [diagnosis
A]”
• “[cue] doesn’t add anything to [diagnosis
A]”
• “[cue] is irrelevant to/has no bearing on
[diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] doesn’t suggest/support/favor
[diagnosis A]
3. ”Cue leads participants away from the
diagnosis:
• “[cue] doesn’t make me think of
[diagnosis A]”
• “[cue] moves me a bit away from
[diagnosis A]”
• “I wouldn’t be looking for [cue] with
[diagnosis A]”
Unclear The cue was evaluated in relation to the
diagnosis, but perceived support for the
diagnosis was unclear
1. Cue’s support for the diagnosis is
ambiguous:
• “[cue] might be because of [diagnosis A]
and it might not be because of [diagnosis
A]”
• “[cue] doesn’t differentiate between
[diagnosis A] and [diagnosis B]”
2. Cue’s support for the diagnosis is
questioned rather than stated:
• “could [cue] suggest [diagnosis A]?”
(Continued)
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
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We note that there are many ways in which response scales might affect proleader and anti-
trailer processes. For example, if separate (vs. single) response scales raise the profile of the
trailing diagnosis (see Introduction), then this could threaten the superiority of the leader by
activating concepts inconsistent with it. This might 1) incite proleader and/or antitrailer distor-
tion to restore cognitive coherence, or it might 2) inhibit proleader and/or antitrailer distortion
by interrupting cognitive coherence (“consider the opposite”). Furthermore, these are not
mutually exclusive: separate (vs. single) response scales could, for example, inhibit proleader
distortion but exacerbate antitrailer distortion. Thus our hypotheses are non-directional; we
aimed to assess whether response scales might influence proleader and antitrailer processes in
any way.
To test these hypotheses, we ran two multilevel logistic regression models (one per hypothe-
sis), each with a random intercept. Themodel forH3 used a physician’s response scale (1 = sepa-
rate, 0 = single) to predict his/her Verb_Lead per cue (1 = supportive; 0 = any other category).
The model forH4 used a physician’s response scale (1 = separate, 0 = single) to predict his/her
Verb_Trail per cue (1 = non-supportive; 0 = any other category).
Recruitment and sample
From a database of UK family physicians who had taken part in previous studies by the second
author, we invited 287 via e-mail. We did not invite physicians who had participated in our
previous studies of distortion because the same patient cases were used [15, 21]. We also made
use of socialmedia, advertising the study online in reputable networking groups exclusive to
UK family physicians. We informed physicians that participation would involve a ±20 minute
telephone call with the researcher (audio-recorded), where they would be required to verbalize
their thoughts as they reasoned over two fictitious patient cases (accessible online). They would
receive a £20 Amazon e-voucher upon completion of data collection.
Of the 287 physicians e-mailed, 44 responded (15%), 27 participated (9%) and one was
excluded because the response scales did not display accurately on his/her computer screen.
This is a low response rate compared to our previous studies of distortion (e.g., [21]: study
1 = 48%, study 2 = 49%). This is likely due to the fact that invited physicians were required to
agree on a specific time for participation and could not participate at their convenience like in
the previous studies. Furthermore, the time commitment was larger than in the previous stud-
ies (20 rather than 10 minutes). Physicians may also have found the prospect of thinking aloud
while solving clinical cases–and being audiotaped–daunting or uncomfortable.
A further 24 physicians were recruited via socialmedia (where a response rate cannot be cal-
culated), yielding a final sample of 50 physicians: 52% females, 27 to 62 years of age (M = 38.5,
SD = 7.9), with 0 to 34 years of experience in family medicine (M = 8.3, SD = 8.1). The single-
Table 1. (Continued)
Code Definition Examples
Nothing The cue was not evaluated in relation to the
diagnosis
N/A
Each participant was assigned two codes per cue: one in relation to the diagnosis that was leading at the
time (“Verb_Lead”) and one in relation to the diagnosis that was trailing at the time (“Verb_Trail”).
* Note: many of the utterances in this subcategory suggest that a cue is irrelevant to a diagnosis: the cue is
not perceived to support the diagnosis but it is not perceived to negate it either. Such utterances could be
coded as “unclear”. We categorized them as such in a second coding of the data and our findings did not
change. Full details are available in the Supporting Information (S3 Text: point 8).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t001
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scale (n = 25) and separate-scales (n = 25) groups were similar in age (M for single = 37.9,
SD = 7.5;M for separate = 39.1, SD = 8.4), experience (M for single = 6.8, SD = 7.0;M for sepa-
rate = 9.7, SD = 9.0), gender (single = 52% female; separate = 52% female) and recruitment
method (single = 52% social media; separate = 44% social media).
For completeness, we report demographic details for the physicians who provided baseline
ratings of cues, used to calculate information distortion in previous studies [15, 21] and in the
present one. Kostopoulou et al. [15] obtained baseline data from 36 physicians: 46% female, 26
to 64 years of age (M = 47.2, SD = 11.6), with 0 to 39 years in family medicine (M = 17.1,
SD = 11.1). Nurek et al. [21] (study 1) obtained baseline data from 43 physicians: 56% female,
29 to 61 years of age (M = 39.1, SD = 8.9), with 0 to 34 years in family medicine (M = 9.9,
SD = 9.9).
Results
Distortion in cue ratings
In the single-scale group, distortion was averaged across cues per physician. The grand mean
for distortion was 1.24 ([0.52, 1.96], SD = 1.74, t (24) = 3.55, p = 0.002, d = 0.71). In the sepa-
rate-scales group, proleader and antitrailer distortion were each averaged across cues per physi-
cian. The grand mean for proleader distortion was 0.71 ([-0.02, 1.44], SD = 1.77, t (24) = 2.00,
p = 0.057, d = 0.40) and that for antitrailer distortion was 0.63 ([-0.02, 1.27], SD = 1.56, t (24) =
2.01, p = 0.055, d = 0.40).
We compared distortion to that identified in our previous studies [15, 21]. Kostopoulou
et al. [15] and Nurek et al. [21] employed three patient cases rather than two, one of which fea-
tured three diagnostic (i.e., non-neutral) cues at its end. The additional patient case and the
diagnostic cues were excluded from the present study to minimize the cognitive and temporal
load placed upon our participants, who were thinking aloud.We thus recalculated distortion in
the previous studies, limiting the data to the two patient cases and neutral cues employed here.
Findings are presented in Table 2. Distortion appeared consistent in the present (column 1)
and previous (column 2) studies, returning no significant differences (column 3). Proleader
and antitrailer distortion did not differ reliably from one another, in the present study (mean
Table 2. Mean distortionin the present study vs. previous studies (Kostopoulou et al., [15] and Nurek et al. [21], study 1).
Distortion Present studya Previous studiesb Mean difference
Single-scale 1.24 1.38 -0.14
[0.52, 1.96] [1.00, 1.76] [-0.99, 0.71]
t(24) = 3.55, p = 0.002 t(101) = 7.12, p< 0.001 t(125) = -0.33, p = 0.740
d = 0.71 d = 0.70 d = 0.07
Separate-scales: Proleader 0.71 0.34 0.37
[-0.02, 1.44] [0.06, 0.61] [-0.27, 1.02]
t(24) = 2.00, p = 0.057 t(95) = 2.42, p = 0.017 t(119) = 1.14, p = 0.255
d = 0.40 d = 0.25 d = 0.26
Separate-scales: Antitrailer 0.63 0.69 -0.06
[-0.02, 1.27] [0.43, 0.95] [-0.66, 0.54]
t(24) = 2.01, p = 0.055 t(95) = 5.23, p< 0.001 t(119) = -0.19, p = 0.848
d = 0.40 d = 0.53 d = 0.04
a n present study = 25 (single-scale) and 25 (separate-scales)
b n previous studies = 102 (single-scale; [15]) and 96 (separate-scales; [21], study 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t002
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difference = 0.08 [-1.09, 1.25], t (24) = 0.14, p = 0.889, d = 0.03) or in Nurek et al.’s previous
study (reanalyzed) (mean difference = 0.35 [-0.12, 0.83], t (95) = 1.47, p = 0.146, d = 0.15).
Inter-rater agreement for verbalizations
Inter-rater agreement was substantial for verbalizations about the leading diagnosis (kappa for
Verb_Lead = 0.84, p< 0.001) and for verbalizations about the trailing diagnosis (kappa for
Verb_Trail = 0.85, p< 0.001).
Measuring proleader and antitrailer processes in verbalizations
(separate-scales group)
We hypothesized that, in the separate-scales group, proleader distortion would be associated
with supportive verbalizations about the leading diagnosis (H1). Table 3 conveys this group’s
verbalizations about the leader, separately for the cues that featured proleader distortion (pro-
leader distortion> 0, column 1) and the cues that did not (proleader distortion 0, column
2). Supportive verbalizations appeared more common when proleader distortion was present
(78%, 101/129) than when it was absent (50%, 38/76). Per cue, greater proleader distortion
(continuous) was associated with greater odds of a supportive Verb_Lead (OR = 1.28 [1.06,
1.55], p = 0.010).
We also hypothesized that, in the separate-scales group, antitrailer distortion would be asso-
ciated with non-supportive verbalizations about the trailing diagnosis (H2). Table 4 conveys
this group’s verbalizations about the trailer, separately for the cues that featured antitrailer dis-
tortion (antitrailer distortion> 0, column 1) and the cues that did not (antitrailer
distortion 0, column 2). Non-supportive verbalizations appeared more common when anti-
trailer distortion was present (38%, 45/119) than when it was absent (9%, 8/86). Per cue,
greater antitrailer distortion (continuous) was associated with greater odds of a non-supportive
Verb_Trail (OR = 1.44 [1.21, 1.70], p< 0.001).
For completeness, we ran the same analyses in regards to the single-scale group. Per cue,
greater distortion (continuous) was associated with greater likelihoodof both a supportive Ver-
b_Lead (OR = 1.20 [1.11, 1.30], p< 0.001) and a non-supportive Verb_Trail (OR = 1.21 [1.07,
1.37], p = 0.003).
Assessing the effect of response scales on verbalizations (single-scale
vs. separate-scales groups)
We hypothesized that if response scales affect proleader processing, then the single-scale group
and the separate-scales group should differ in their tendency to provide supportive verbaliza-
tions with respect to the leading diagnosis (H3). Table 5 conveys verbalizations about the
Table 3. Separate-scales group: frequency and proportion of codes assigned to verbalizations about the leading diagnosis (Verb_Lead).
Verb_Lead Cues featuring proleader distortion Cues featuring no proleader distortion Total
Supportive 101 (78%) 38 (50%) 139 (68%)
Non-supportive 6 (5%) 23 (30%) 29 (14%)
Unclear 12 (9%) 12 (16%) 24 (12%)
Nothing 10 (8%) 3 (4%) 13 (6%)
Total 129 76 205a
a The separate-scales group evaluated 225 cues in total (9 per physician). Eighteen cues were excluded, as the physicians in question held no leading
diagnosis at the time that these cues were evaluated (diagnostic likelihood = 0). Two cues were not verbally evaluated due to technical problems.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t003
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leading diagnosis, separately for the single-scale group (column 1) and the separate-scales
group (column 2). The two groups did not appear to differ in their tendency to provide sup-
portive Verb_Leads (single = 64%, 134/210; separate = 68%,139/205) and our multilevel logis-
tic regression confirmed this (OR = 1.20 [0.77, 1.90], p = 0.421).
We also hypothesized that if response scales affect antitrailer processing, then the two
response-scale groups should differ in their tendency to provide non-supportive verbalizations
with respect to the trailing diagnosis (H4). Table 6 conveys verbalizations about the trailing
diagnosis, separately for the single-scale group (column 1) and the separate-scales group (col-
umn 2). The two groups appeared to differ in their tendency to provide non-supportive Verb_-
Trails (single = 7%, 14/210; separate = 26%, 53/205) and our multilevel logistic regression
confirmed this (OR = 4.86 [2.16, 10.94], p< 0.001): the separate-scales group was significantly
more likely than the single-scale group to make non-supportive verbalizations about their trail-
ing diagnosis.
Notably, the separate-scales group also appeared more likely to make non-supportive ver-
balizations about their leader (Table 5: single = 3%, 7/210; separate = 14%, 29/205). We
explored this in a multilevel logistic regression (random intercept) that used response scale (+-
0.5 = separate, -0.5 = single), diagnosis (+0.5 = trailing, -0.5 = leading) and their interaction to
predict Verb (1 = non-supportive, 0 = any other category) per cue. It returned a reliable effect
for response scale (OR = 4.77 [2.49, 9.14], p< 0.001), a reliable effect for diagnosis (OR = 2.09
[1.23, 3.57], p = 0.007) and no reliable interaction (OR = 1.03 [0.35, 2.98], p = 0.963). This sug-
gests that the separate (vs. single) scale group was more likely to make non-supportive verbali-
zations about both the leader and the trailer, with no significant difference between the two.
Table 4. Separate-scales group: frequency and proportion of codes assigned to verbalizations about the trailing diagnosis (Verb_Trail).
Verb_Trail Cues featuring antitrailer distortion Cues featuring no antitrailer distortion Total
Supportive 51 (43%) 61 (71%) 112 (55%)
Non-supportive 45 (38%) 8 (9%) 53 (26%)
Unclear 16 (13%) 8 (9%) 24 (12%)
Nothing 7 (6%) 9 (11%) 16 (8%)
Total 119 86 205a
a The separate-scales group evaluated 225 cues in total (9 per physician). Eighteen cues were excluded, as the physicians in question held no leading
diagnosis at the time that these cues were evaluated (diagnostic likelihood = 0). Two cues were not verbally evaluated due to technical problems.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t004
Table 5. Frequency and proportion of codes assigned to verbalizations about the leading diagnosis
(Verb_Lead).
Verb_Lead All cues: single-scale All cues: separate-scales Total
Supportive 134 (64%) 139 (68%) 273 (66%)
Non-supportive 7 (3%) 29 (14%) 36 (9%)
Unclear 44 (21%) 24 (12%) 68 (16%)
Nothing 25 (12%) 13 (6%) 38 (9%)
Total 210a 205a 415
a Each group evaluated 225 cues in total (9 per physician). Thirty-twocues were excluded (single-scale = 14;
separate-scales = 18), as the physicians in question held no leading diagnosis at the time that these cues
were evaluated (diagnostic likelihood = 0). Three cues were not verbally evaluated due to technical problems
(single-scale = 1; separate-scales = 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t005
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Finally, we compared the two groups in terms of attention paid to the leader vs. the trailer.
We used response scale (+0.5 = separate, -0.5 = single), diagnosis (+0.5 = trailing, -0.5 = leading)
and their interaction to predict Verb per cue: Verb = 0 if no evaluation was verbalized (“noth-
ing”) and Verb = 1 if any evaluation was verbalized (any other category).We found a reliable
effect for response scale (OR = 2.39 [1.15, 4.95], p = 0.020), no reliable effect for diagnosis
(OR = 0.69 [0.42, 1.12], p = 0.130) and no reliable interaction (OR = 1.35 [0.51, 3.56],
p = 0.548). This suggests that the separate (vs. single) scale group was more likely to attend to
both the leader and the trailer, with no significant difference between the two.
Discussion
We explored the effect of two different response scales on the processes thought to underlie
predecisional information distortion. Family physicians thought aloud as they evaluated clini-
cal cues in relation to two competing diagnostic hypotheses, in the context of two patient cases.
One group did so using the single response scale traditional to SEP (the single-scale group); the
other group did so using the separate response scales introducedmore recently (the separate-
scales group). We measured proleader and antitrailer processes in verbalizations, and com-
pared these verbalizations in the two study groups.
Verbal measurement of proleader and antitrailer processing
In the separate-scales group, we identified a correspondence between cue distortion in relation
to a diagnostic hypothesis (leading/trailing) and verbalizations about that diagnostic hypothe-
sis. As expected, proleader distortion was associated with supportive verbalizations about the
leader and antitrailer distortion was associated with non-supportive verbalizations about the
trailer. In the single-scale group, similar patterns were identified: cue distortion was associated
with both the former and the latter.
These findings advance the literature in two ways. Firstly, they suggest that verbalizations
can serve as a valid indicator of proleader and antitrailer processes. Our study is not the first to
measure biased predecisional processing in verbalizations (e.g., [41–43]), but it is–to our
knowledge–the first to validate its verbal measure against an established behavioral one; that is,
information distortion as measured by numerical cue ratings (SEP). Secondly, our findings
suggest that even when distortion is measured on a single response scale, both proleader and
antitrailer processes operate to some extent. Our study is not the first to suggest this [19], but it
is–to our knowledge–the first to provide evidence based on data collected using the single scale
itself.
Table 6. Frequency and proportion of codes assigned to verbalizations about the trailing diagnosis
(Verb_Trail).
Verb_Trail All cues: single-scale All cues: separate-scales Total
Supportive 114 (54%) 112 (55%) 226 (55%)
Non-supportive 14 (7%) 53 (26%) 67 (16%)
Unclear 43 (20%) 24 (12%) 67 (16%)
Nothing 39 (19%) 16 (8%) 55 (13%)
Total 210a 205a 415
a Each group evaluated 225 cues in total (9 per physician). Thirty-twocues were excluded (single-scale = 14;
separate-scales = 18), as the physicians in question held no leading diagnosis at the time that these cues
were evaluated (diagnostic likelihood = 0). Three cues were not verbally evaluated due to technical problems
(single-scale = 1; separate-scales = 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562.t006
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Effect of response scales on proleader and antitrailer processing
We compared the frequency of proleader and antitrailer verbalizations across the single-scale and
separate-scales groups. Response scales did not appear to affect proleader processing: the two
groups were equally likely to verbalize support for their leading diagnosis. The scales did, how-
ever, appear to affect antitrailer processing: the separate-scales group was significantlymore likely
to denigrate their trailing diagnosis. One possible explanation is attentional: separate (vs. single)
response scales raised the profile of the trailing diagnosis, perhaps explaining its denigration.
Interestingly, the leading diagnosis also receivedmore attention and more non-supportive
verbalizations in the separate-scales group than in the single-scale group. Asking physicians to
evaluate cues in relation to each diagnostic competitor may have led them to question their
leading hypothesis, simply by activating concepts inconsistent with it (“consider the opposite”
[33]). Alternatively, separate (vs. single) response scales might simply be more conducive to
negative evaluations of a cue’s support for a diagnosis, given that their lowest point (0) is
anchored at “no support” (vs. “favors neither”).
Our findings suggest that the response scales used to measure distortionmight influence its
constituent processes, which could limit generalizability across and beyond experimental stud-
ies. Distortion as measured on separate response scalesmight not reflect distortion as measured
on a single one, and bothmight misrepresent distortion as it occurs in practice. In the present
study, physicians were required to 1) evaluate incoming items of patient data in relation to
competing diagnostic hypotheses and 2) update their diagnostic belief after each. Faced with a
new item of patient information, physicians in practicemight do neither.
Nevertheless, using a more ecologically valid design that involved Active Information
Search [44] and no intermediary rating of cues, Kostopoulou, Mousoulis, and Delaney [45]
found evidence for both proleader and antitrailer processes in physicians’ diagnostic reasoning.
Furthermore, the in/exclusion of intermediary cue ratings does not appear to affect final
choices [9, 18, 46]). If indeed distortion operates in daily diagnosis and to negative end, our
findings suggest that debiasing is possible. To the extent that task features such as response
scales affect evaluative processes, then these processes are malleable (i.e., subject to manipula-
tion). Future work could explore whether and how different approaches to cue evaluation
might mitigate distortion. DeKay and colleagues [20] identified a near-significant (p = 0.063)
decrease in distortion when they altered the wording of their separate response scales: distor-
tion (averaged across proleader and antitrailer) was lower when the separate scales encouraged
absolute evaluation of an option (“very unappealing” to “very appealing” for option A [B])
rather than relative evaluation of an option (“strongly disfavors” to “strongly favors” for option
A [B]). Rewording the separate scales did not eliminate proleader or antitrailer distortion (nor
alter their relative magnitudes) [20], but its potential to perhaps reduce distortion is encourag-
ing. If a debiasing approach to cue evaluation is identified, then distortion could perhaps be
countered throughmetacognitive training (“metacognitive strategies” [47]; “cognitive forcing”
[48]), though questions surround the feasibility and long-term efficacyof such training in med-
ical practice [49–51].
Limitations
The think aloud methodology carries inherent limitations. Arguably, introspective access to
cognitive processes is limited [52]: participants can only verbalize cognitions that are heeded or
“focally attended” [36, 39]. To the extent that relevant cognitions occur automatically or pre-
attentively [53, 54], verbal reports may be incomplete [36, 39].
A second limitation of the think aloud method is its potential for interference with the task
of interest [34]. Asking physicians to think aloud while solving a diagnostic problem could
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alter their reasoning in a number of ways, e.g., through competition for cognitive resources for
the diagnostic vs. the verbalization task, through improved recall via auditory feedback, or
through the generation of new inferences and improved strategies on account of heightened
reflection [34]. Furthermore, asking physicians to think aloud in the (telephonic) presence of a
researcher could induce or exacerbate “social desirability” bias [55], which might further alter
responses.We note also that our control participants did not think aloud; they simply provided
cue ratings online. To the extent that concurrent verbalization influenced cue ratings, this pro-
cedural difference between the experimental and the control groups could threaten our esti-
mates of distortion. However, a prominent and comprehensive review found no evidence to
suggest that thinking aloud alters thought processes: on objectivemeasures of task perfor-
mance, participants in think-aloud conditions did not differ from their “silent control” coun-
terparts [37] (see also [36], chapter 2). In a recent study, family physicians diagnosed patient
cases under both think aloud (via telephone) and silent conditions; diagnostic accuracy did not
differ between the two [56]. Likewise, the distortion identified in the present study did not dif-
fer from that identified in our previous studies [15, 21] (Table 2), where physicians completed
the same tasks under silent conditions. (For a more detailed discussion of distortion in our
present vs. previous studies, see S4 Text).
We note that our sample size was small, due to a low response rate. This may have limited our
quantitative analysis, whichmust temper our broader conclusions. Future work might apply the
present methods to larger samples drawn frommore accessible populations.We note also that
verbal reports are rich; a more fine-grained analysis than ours could generate new or deeper
insights into a complex phenomenon. For example, future work might explore subtypes of “sup-
portive” and “non-supportive” verbalizations, sorted by (e.g.) strength or kind. Alternatively,
future work could obtain a directmeasure of verbal distortion–akin to SEP’s direct measure of
distortion in cue ratings–by collecting verbal data under control conditions (that is, while partici-
pants provide baseline ratings of cues, see S1 Text) and comparing these to verbal data collected
under experimental conditions. By this nuancedmeasure, verbal proleader [antitrailer] distortion
would require a more supportive [less supportive] verbalization than was provided at baseline.
Finally, protocol analysis requires reflexivity. Coders were aware of the study hypotheses.
They were also aware of each physician’s leading diagnosis at each cue evaluation, which could
not be extricated from cue verbalizations themselves. This may have created a meta-bias: cod-
ers may have been biased to identify bias in physicians’ verbalizations (e.g., supportive [non-
supportive] verbalizations about leading [trailing] diagnoses).However, findings fromH1 and
H2 suggest not: coders were blinded to the distortion displayed per cue, yet coding appeared to
reflect this well in both response-scale groups.
Despite these limitations, the present study lends insight into the processes underlying pre-
decisional information distortion, and the factors that may affect them. It contributes to this
fresh and dynamic literature both methodologically and theoretically. Firstly, it triangulates
numeric ratings with verbal data: it maps distortion as measured by response scales to verbali-
zations as measured by think aloud, and uses this mapping to explore reactivity in the response
scales themselves. This mixed-methods approach may be extended and refined in future work.
Secondly, it identifies reactivity in the response scales used to measure distortion. This could
impact the generalizability of findings between and beyond experimental studies, which should
be considered when designing and reporting future work.
Supporting Information
S1 Dataset.
(CSV)
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562 September 14, 2016 14 / 17
S1 Text. Procedure for obtaining baseline ratings for clinical cues in previous studies of
information distortion in physicians’ diagnostic judgments.
(PDF)
S2 Text. Calculationof leader-signeddistortion in the single-scalegroup and the separate-
scales group.
(PDF)
S3 Text. Guidelines for coding verbal protocols.
(PDF)
S4 Text. Distortion in our present vs. previous studies.
(PDF)
S5 Text. Data key:Variables in “S1_Dataset.csv”.
(PDF)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Dr. Miguel Angel Vadillo Nistal for providing comments on an earlier
version of the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization:MNOK.
Formal analysis:MNOK.
Funding acquisition:MNOK.
Investigation:MN.
Methodology:MNOK.
Project administration:MN.
Supervision:OK.
Writing – original draft:MNOK.
Writing – review& editing:MNOK.
References
1. Russo JE, Medvec VH, Meloy MG. The distortion of information during decisions. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 1996; 66(1):102–10.
2. Russo JE, Meloy MG, Medvec VH. Predecisional distortion of product information. Journal of Marketing
Research. 1998; 35(4):438–52.
3. Holyoak KJ, Simon D. Bidirectional reasoning in decision making by constraint satisfaction. Journal of
Experimental Psychology-General. 1999; 128(1):3–31.
4. Russo JE, Meloy MG, Wilks TJ. Predecisional distortion of information by auditors and salespersons.
Management Science. 2000; 46(1):13–27.
5. Simon D, Pham LB, Le QA, Holyoak KJ. The emergence of coherence over the course of decision mak-
ing. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memoryand Cognition. 2001; 27(5):1250–60.
6. Brownstein AL. Biased predecision processing. Psychological Bulletin. 2003; 129(4):545–68. PMID:
12848220
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562 September 14, 2016 15 / 17
7. Simon D, Snow CJ, Read SJ. The redux of cognitive consistency theories: Evidence judgments by con-
straint satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2004; 86(6):814–37. PMID:
15149257
8. Meloy MG, Russo JE. Binary choice under instructions to select versus reject. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes. 2004; 93(2):114–28.
9. Carlson KA, Meloy MG, Russo JE. Leader-driven primacy: Using attribute order to affect consumer
choice. Journal of Consumer Research. 2006; 32(4):513–8.
10. Russo JE, Carlson KA, Meloy MG. Choosing an inferior alternative. Psychological Science. 2006; 17
(10):899–904. PMID: 17100791
11. DeKay ML, Patino-Echeverri D, Fischbeck PS. Distortionof probability and outcome information in
risky decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2009; 109(1):79–92.
12. Polman E. Information distortion in self-other decision making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy. 2010; 46(2):432–5.
13. DeKay ML, Stone ER, Miller SA. Leader-driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects
choices between risky prospects. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 2011; 24(4):394–411.
14. Russo JE, Yong K. The distortion of information to supportan emerging evaluation of risk. Journal of
Econometrics. 2011; 162(1):132–9.
15. Kostopoulou O, Russo JE, Keenan G, Delaney BC, Douiri A. Information distortion in physicians’ diag-
nostic judgments. Medical Decision Making. 2012; 32(6):831–9. doi: 10.1177/0272989X12447241
PMID: 22622846
16. Boyle PJ, Hanlon D, Russo J. The value of task conflict to group decisions. Journal of Behavioral Deci-
sion Making. 2012; 25(3):217–27.
17. Polman E, Russo JE. Commitment to a developing preference and predecisional distortion of informa-
tion. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2012; 119(1):78–88.
18. Miller SA, DeKay ML, Stone ER, Sorenson CM. Assessing the sensitivity of information distortion to
four potential influences in studies of risky choice. Judgment and Decision Making. 2013; 8(6):662–77.
19. Blanchard SJ, Carlson KA, Meloy MG. Biased predecisional processing of leading and nonleading
alternatives. Psychological Science. 2014; 25(3):812–6. doi: 10.1177/0956797613512663 PMID:
24403397
20. DeKay ML, Miller SA, Schley DR, Erford BM. Proleader and antitrailer information distortion and their
effects on choice and postchoice memory. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
2014; 125(2):134–50.
21. Nurek M, Kostopoulou O, Hagmayer Y. Predecisional information distortion in physicians' diagnostic
judgments: Strengthening a leading hypothesis or weakening its competitor? Judgment and Decision
Making. 2014; 9(6):572–85.
22. Chaxel A-S. The impact of a relational mindset on information distortion.Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology. 2015; 60(0):1–7.
23. Russo JE, Carlson KA, Meloy MG, Yong K. The goal of consistency as a cause of information distortion.
Journal of Experimental Psychology-General. 2008; 137(3):456–70. doi: 10.1037/a0012786 PMID:
18729710
24. Glöckner A, Betsch T, Schindler N. Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks. Journal of Behav-
ioral Decision Making. 2010; 23(5):439–62.
25. DeKay ML. Predecisional information distortion and the self-fulfilling prophecy of early preferences in
choice. Current Directions in Psychological Science. 2015; 24(5):405–11.
26. Russo JE. The predecisional distortion of information. In: Wilhelms EA, Reyna VF, editors. Neuroeco-
nomics, judgment, and decision making. Frontiers of cognitive psychology. New York: Psychology
Press; 2015. p. 91–110.
27. Carlson KA, Russo JE. Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology-Applied. 2001; 7(2):91–103. PMID: 11477983
28. Carlson KA, Pearo LK. Limiting predecisional distortion by prior valuation of attribute components.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 2004; 94(1):48–59.
29. Meloy MG, Russo JE, Miller GC. Monetary incentives and mood. Journal of Marketing Research. 2006;
43(2):267–75.
30. Engel C, Glöckner A. Role-induced bias in court: An experimental analysis. Journal of Behavioral Deci-
sion Making. 2013; 26(3):272–84.
31. Lichtenstein S, Slovic P. Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1971; 89(1):46–55.
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562 September 14, 2016 16 / 17
32. Hsee CK. The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between joint and sepa-
rate evaluations of alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 1996; 67
(3):247–57.
33. Larrick RP. Debiasing. In: Koehler DJ, Harvey N, editors. Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision
making. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd; 2004. p. 316–37.
34. Russo JE, Johnson E, Stephens D. The validity of verbal protocols. Memory & Cognition. 1989; 17
(6):759–69.
35. Schulte-Mecklenbeck M, Kühberger A, Ranyard R. A handbook of process tracing methods for decision
research: A critical review and user’s guide: Psychology Press; 2010.
36. Ericsson K, Simon H. Protocol analysis: Verbal reportsas data. Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT press; 1993.
37. Fox MC, Ericsson KA, Best R. Do procedures for verbal reportingof thinking have to be reactive? A
meta-analysis and recommendations for best reportingmethods. Psychological Bulletin. 2011; 137
(2):316. doi: 10.1037/a0021663 PMID: 21090887
38. Ericsson K, Moxley J. Thinking aloud protocols: Concurrent verbalizations of thinking during perfor-
mance on tasks involving decision making. In: Schulte-Mecklenbeck M, hberger A, Ranyard R, editors.
A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research. Society for Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing. New York: Psychology Press; 2011. p. 89–114.
39. Harte JM, Westenberg MRM, van Someren M. Process models of decision making. Acta Psychologica.
1994; 87(2–3):95–120.
40. Svenson O. Eliciting and analysing verbal protocols in process studies of judgement and decision mak-
ing. In: MontgomeryH, Svenson O, editors. Process and structure in human decision making. Oxford,
England: John Wiley & Sons; 1989. p. 65–81.
41. Backlund L, Skånér Y, MontgomeryH, Bring J, Strender L-E. Doctors’ decision processes in a drug-
prescription task: The validity of rating scales and think-aloud reports.Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes. 2003; 91(1):108–17.
42. Montgomery H, Svenson O. A think aloud study of dominance structuring in decision processes. In:
Montgomery H, Svenson O, editors. Process and structure in human decision making. Oxford,
England: John Wiley & Sons; 1989. p. 135–50.
43. Montgomery H. Towards a perspective theory of decision making and judgment. Acta Psychologica.
1994; 87(2–3):155–78. PMID: 7810350
44. Huber O, Wider R, Huber OW. Active information search and complete information presentation in nat-
uralistic risky decision tasks. Acta Psychologica. 1997; 95(1):15–29.
45. Kostopoulou O, Mousoulis C, Delaney BC. Information search and information distortion in the diagno-
sis of an ambiguous presentation. Judgment and Decision Making. 2009; 4(5):408–18.
46. Russo JE, Chaxel A-S. How persuasive messages can influence behavior without awareness. Journal
of Consumer Psychology. 2010; 20(3):338–42.
47. Willingham DT. Critical thinking. American Educator. 2007; 31:8–19.
48. Croskerry P. Cognitive forcing strategies in clinical decisionmaking. Annals of Emergency Medicine.
2003; 41(1):110–20. PMID: 12514691
49. Graber M. Metacognitive training to reduce diagnostic errors: ready for prime time? Academic Medi-
cine. 2003; 78(8):781. PMID: 12915364
50. Graber ML, Kissam S, Payne VL, Meyer AND, Sorensen A, Lenfestey N, et al. Cognitive interventions
to reduce diagnostic error: a narrative review. BMJ Quality & Safety. 2012; 21(7):535–57.
51. Sherbino J, Kulasegaram K, Howey E, Norman G. Ineffectiveness of cognitive forcing strategies to
reduce biases in diagnostic reasoning: a controlled trial. Canadian Journal of Emergency Medicine.
2014; 16(01):34–40.
52. Nisbett RE, Wilson TD. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reportson mental processes. Psycho-
logical Review. 1977; 84(3):231.
53. Schmidt HG, Boshuizen HP. On acquiring expertise in medicine. Educational Psychology Review.
1993; 5(3):205–21.
54. Norman GR, Brooks LR. The non-analytical basis of clinical reasoning. Advances in Health Sciences
Education: Theory and Practice. 1997; 2(2):173–84.
55. Nederhof AJ. Methods of coping with social desirability bias: A review. European journal of social psy-
chology. 1985; 15(3):263–80.
56. Kostopoulou O, Sirota M, Round T, Samaranayaka S, Delaney BC. The role of physicians' first impres-
sions in the diagnosis of possible cancers without alarm symptoms. Medical Decision Making. doi: 10.
1177/0272989X16644563 [Epub ahead of print].
Reactivity of Response Scales Measuring Information Distortion in Medical Diagnosis
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0162562 September 14, 2016 17 / 17
